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**1962/11/03**

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Cuban

November 3, 1962

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To: The Secretary

From: S/AL - Llewellyn E. Thompson

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation -- Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR, and Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State, 12:00 noon, Saturday, November 3, 1962

After a discussion of other subjects, Ambassador Dobrynin said that based on his conversation with Mr. Mikoyan in New York, the Soviets had the feeling that their part of the agreement on Cuba was being carried out in detail, but that we were shying away from any attempt to spell out our commitment. He indicated that the Soviets expected this to be done in some form whether by a protocol, an exchange of letters, or declarations.

I said that negotiations were going forward in New York on this matter and I could not get engaged in any negotiation on it here. I was, however, glad to give him any background I could on our thinking about the problem. I said it seemed to me that there were two basic factors which were still not clear. One of them was whether or not the Soviets were going to remove any military capability they had in Cuba and not use Cuba as a military base in this hemisphere. The second was to what extent the Cuban Government was not only going to try to frustrate the implementation of the United States-Soviet agreement but also to what extent Cuba was going to continue to carry on what we considered subversive activities in this hemisphere. I referred to the blowing up of oil well installations in Venezuela as the kind of activity I was referring to. I stated that the President had made clear his willingness to give assurance against

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invasion as part of an agreement between us, but it was not clear how this agreement was going to be carried out and to what extent. I referred to the article in last night's "Washington Star" alleging specific information that Soviet missiles were being put into caves and said that this made the problem of verifying that Soviet missiles in Cuba were taken out very important both for the United States Government and for public opinion.

Dobrynin indicated that one of the things he had in mind in raising this question was the fact that we have not lifted the quarantine. I drew his attention to the relationship of this to the fact that the Cuban Government had publicly taken a stand against any verification either now or presumably in the future. I said that so far as incoming shipments were concerned that this could be handled by the International Committee of the Red Cross and he indicated that this was already entrained. I pointed out, however, that there would remain the question as to whether there were any offensive weapons remaining in Cuba and said I thought it was up to the Soviets and in their interest to find some means of satisfying us on this point.

With respect to subversive activities, I drew to Dobrynin's attention the virtual impossibility of spelling out in detail any agreements on this subject and reminded him of the difficulties we had over their proposal in Geneva for an agreement against the carrying out of any war propaganda. I said we could not be in a position to control speeches or even radio broadcasts completely in this country, let alone Latin America, without changing radically our whole system of government. I said I was certain, however, that if the Soviets gave up any attempt to use Cuba as a military base, and if the Castro Government in fact did not threaten the other governments of this hemisphere, he could be sure that the United States would not only not invade, but would be scrupulous in not supporting attempts by anyone else to do so.

At the end of the conversation, as he was leaving, I said that he must have been in a very awkward position over this whole

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and he said that this was quite true, and declared categorically that he had not known of the Soviet operation in Cuba. I said that I believed his statement and felt sure that Secretary Rusk did also.

Copy to:

U - Mr. Ball  
Mr. Bundy  
G - Mr. Johnson  
ARA - Mr. Martin  
INR - Mr. Hilsman  
IO - Mr. Cleveland  
Embassy, Moscow

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